Evaluating a New Mac for Current and Next Generation Rfid by Zhilyaev, Serge
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
2010
Evaluating a New Mac for Current and Next
Generation Rfid
Serge Zhilyaev
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses
Part of the Other Computer Engineering Commons
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 -
February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Zhilyaev, Serge, "Evaluating a New Mac for Current and Next Generation Rfid" (2010). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 393.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/393
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATING A NEW MAC FOR CURRENT AND NEXT GENERATION RFID 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented 
by 
SERGE ZHILYAEV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING 
 
February 2010 
 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by Serge Zhilyaev 2010 
All Rights Reserved 
 
  
 
 
EVALUATING A NEW MAC FOR CURRENT AND NEXT GENERATION RFID 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented 
by 
SERGE ZHILYAEV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
 
______________________________________ 
Wayne P. Burleson, Chair 
 
 
______________________________________ 
Kevin Fu, Member 
 
 
______________________________________ 
Andras C. Moritz, Member 
 
 
__________________________________________ 
C.V. Hollot, Department Head 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my parents. 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 First and foremost, I would like to thank Professor Wayne Burleson for providing me 
with an opportunity to experience this journey and for all of his advice and support.  I would 
also like to thank Professors Wayne Burleson, Kevin Fu, and Andras Moritz for their service 
on my committee.  Thanks to Professor Christof Paar for his invaluable advice and words of 
encouragement.  I would like to thank my family and friends for their support throughout my 
academic career.  I thank the entire VLSI Circuits and Systems group as well as the RFID-
CUSP group for their advice and assistance.  Special thanks to Jinwook Jang, Basab Datta, 
and Mike Todd. 
 
vi 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
EVALUATING A NEW MAC FOR CURRENT AND NEXT GENERATION RFID 
FEBRUARY 2010 
SERGE ZHILYAEV 
B.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Wayne Burleson 
 
Pervasive computing is an emerging technology in which inexpensive devices are 
used in a variety of applications which include authentication, identification, and micro 
payments. These systems need protection from malicious users but often are too constrained 
for traditional security algorithms. As a result, new algorithms dubbed lightweight have been 
proposed. We evaluate one such algorithm called SQUASH [1] and propose changes that 
reduce both area and latency. Our proposed changes take advantage of the underlying 
squaring operation in SQUASH.  We also show that aggressive over minimization of the 
adder in [1] results in the addition of an auxiliary register that is used to store state: the cost 
of which is much greater than a more complex adder. By using a different adder architecture 
and taking advantage of the associative property of addition, we can eliminate the auxiliary 
register and decrease latency; resulting in an area reduction of 17 % and a latency reduction 
of 50 %. 
To reduce area and latency further, we propose a new variant which we call permuted 
vii 
SQUASH (PSQUASH).  The new variant eliminates the duplicate NLFSR found in 
SQUASH by using a static permutation to reorder the NLFSR output before the squaring 
operation.  PSQUASH retains the formal proof of security of SQUASH, but is significantly 
smaller.  The smallest configuration of PSQUASH is synthesized in 1624 GE (gate 
equivalents).  While our proposed changes to the hardware implementation of PSQUASH 
offer a sizable improvement over published work in both area and latency, the design may 
still be prohibitive for some applications mainly due to relatively high latency. The small size 
of PSQUASH still makes the hardware approach attractive when latency is not an issue; for 
example, PSQUASH can be a good fit for access control or authentic replacement parts.   
Adi Shamir proposes that SQUASH may be best suited for next generation RFID tags 
because it can be scaled to arbitrary precision.  We explore SQUASH on an embedded 
platform and show that the benefit of a wider ALU is negated by the inefficiency of NLFSR 
shifts in software.  We provide a method to select a partial product ordering to minimize 
NLFSR shifts for any SQUASH configuration. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are highly constrained devices capable of 
limited computation.  As the name suggests, a common purpose of these devices is to provide 
identification.  For example, Electronic Product Code (EPC) [2] Ultra High Frequency (UHF) 
RFID tags may replace the barcode or Universal Product Code (UPC).  While the familiar 
barcode is still on consumer products, RFID integration into retail stores is evident with Wal-
Mart’s adoption of RFID systems for inventory tracking [3].  RFID tags are often embedded in 
credit cards and other payment methods, like micro payment cards.  They are used in access 
cards, passports, and can be implanted into animals for tracking.  RFID tags for medical supplies 
can save lives by reducing human error in hospitals, and RFID tags can be an effective tool in the 
fight against counterfeiting.  Many exciting applications have been proposed for these devices 
and this technology continues to expand its impact on our lives. 
Unit cost per tag is a major consideration for RFID tags because some applications need 
low cost tags to be feasible.  Cost may be a secondary consideration in passports or credit cards 
because security is paramount and these devices may pass that cost on to the consumer without 
much concern.  In an application like product tagging, cost is paramount, and the cost per tag 
needs to be low; otherwise, the benefits of RFID are outweighed by the cost.  Securing RFID 
tags and providing privacy in consumer applications, while limiting cost per tag, has been the 
focus of much academic work.  Due to the constraints on memory, power consumption, and 
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amount of logic on RFID devices, standard cryptographic primitives are often unsuitable.  This 
has led to a new class of cryptographic primitives and protocols that have been dubbed 
lightweight crypto, which are designed with resource constraints in mind.  
Some of the first lightweight crypto work reduced the size and power consumption of 
standard algorithms like AES or DES by serialization or other techniques [4, 5].  Works like 
PRESENT [6] and the steam cipher competition eSTREAM [7] took lightweight cryptography 
further by designing new ciphers for resource constrained devices.  Lightweight message 
authentication codes (MAC), or authentication schemes in general, have not received as much 
attention as symmetric ciphers; although, using symmetric ciphers for authentication has been 
proposed [4].  The HB protocol and its variants [8, 9, 10, 11], which are based on the solving 
parity with noise problem, are a lightweight authentication scheme but have several drawbacks 
[1].  A recent proposal called SQUASH [1] is a simple challenge response MAC for RFID.  
SQUASH focuses on providing authentication and does not preserve privacy; however, it does 
not require a source of randomness on the tag or a heavy computationally load on the backend. 
 
1.2 SQUASH for RFID 
 SQUASH has several advantages and one big disadvantage over other authentication 
methods for RFID.  Many lightweight authentication methods that have been proposed are only 
resistant against a passive adversary.  Active attacks against the HB schemes and [12, 13] have 
exposed vulnerabilities.  Many of the proposed methods shift computational workload to a 
backend server, which can expose them to a man in the middle attack [14].  Many RFID 
authentication schemes are tailored to the supply chain applications which can expect to have a 
centralized system with backend server support; however, the backend server requirement itself 
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can be a disadvantage because it may not be practical or even available for all applications.  
While SQUASH requires a shared secret between the reader and key, it does not require a 
backend server to perform calculations or exhaustive searches. 
 SQUASH does not require the tag to generate any random bits.  RFID tags generally do 
not have a true random number generator (TRNG) and many authentication protocols require a 
large number of high quality random bits.  Random number generators on RFID tags are usually 
weak pseudorandom stream generators whose purpose is for collision avoidance in the 
communication protocol.  This means that if an authentication scheme needs TRNG, it must be 
added to the tag. 
 SQUASH does have two major drawbacks which are higher area and potentially higher 
latency.  Without going into details, the SQUASH architecture is much more complex than other 
lightweight RFID authentication schemes.  Other authentication schemes shift the computational 
load onto a backend server, which minimizes the resources required by the tag.  SQUASH can be 
deployed without backend server support but this requires greater tag resources.  Unlike 
probabilistic authentication schemes such as HB, which require multiple queries to the tag, 
SQUASH only requires a single query; however the response takes thousands of cycles for the 
SQUASH designs explored in [15], which is a major drawback.  This thesis evaluates and 
improves SQUASH for current and next generation RFID by reducing area and latency. 
 
1.3 RFID Tags and Related Resource Constrained Devices 
 In this thesis we use RFID and resource constrained device interchangeably.  This work 
can apply to any resource constrained device but sometimes we focus on RFID.  We believe 
these devices are especially positioned to become the dominant resource constrained device 
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deployed in the future.  Some general classes of RFID tags and other resource constrained 
devices are briefly described in this section. 
 
Low Frequency (LF) tags operate in the 125–134.2 kHz and 140–148.5 kHz 
range and work by inductive coupling. 
 
High Frequency (HF) tags (13.56 MHz) also use inductive coupling. 
 
Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) tags operate in the 868–928 MHz range; and 
unlike LF or HF tags, UHF tags use backscatter to communicate with the reader.  
They also have increased read range but can be unreliable in certain environments 
because the signal may be reflected by metal objects or absorbed by water. 
 
Microwave tags further increase read range; however these tags are almost 
exclusively battery assisted.  Automobile toll collection is a common application 
for these tags. 
 
Passive tags do not have a battery; instead they harvest power from the reader’s 
radio signal. 
 
Active tags have a battery; which increases the read range and capability of these 
devices over their passive counterparts, but drives up costs. 
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Contactless Smartcards do not use a wireless channel for communication.  
Physical contact is required to communicate with the device. 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
 A SQUASH implementation on FPGA was published in [15]; which concluded that while 
SQUASH consumed a large area, an ASIC implementation may be more competitive.  In this 
thesis we synthesize SQUASH as an ASIC implementation.  We find that in addition to its 
inherent high latency, SQUASH consumes more area than other lightweight primitives.  In 
chapter two we introduce SQUASH and show that it can be improved by optimizing for 
squaring.  In chapter three we propose a new variant we call PSQUASH, which achieves further 
reduction in area and latency.  Chapter four explores SQUASH on embedded microprocessors.  
The final chapter draws conclusions and discusses the practical applications of SQUASH. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A NEW MAC FOR RFID 
2.1 Introduction 
Some applications require the ability to authenticate a RFID tag.  Anti-counterfeiting 
tag’s main task is to authenticate a product; for example, a cell phone replacement battery can 
benefit from an anti-counterfeiting tag.  If the cost of the tag is minimal, a cell phone 
manufacturer can embed a tag into the battery and be able to detect if a replacement battery is 
authentic.  Since replacement parts are often a significant portion of revenue, the manufacturer 
can ensure its own battery is used by detecting competitors’ batteries and draining them faster 
than its own product.  Anti-counterfeiting for replacement parts or to authenticate brand names 
are one application, others include access cards, passports, and micro payment cards. 
There are a multitude of existing applications, which require the ability to authenticate a 
tag, and new applications are likely to emerge; however there are few authentication schemes for 
RFID.  A new proposal, SQUASH or “SQUare-hASH” by Adi Shamir [1] is a challenge 
response MAC for RFID.  SQUASH does not require a source of randomness on the tag and is 
scalable to arbitrary word size.  Unlike other authentication schemes SQUASH has a formal 
proof of security [1]. 
 
2.2 A New MAC for RFID 
 SQUASH [1] is a challenge-response MAC proposed by Adi Shamir.  The idea behind 
SQUASH is to create a hash function that is not necessarily collision resistant, because collision 
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resistance is costly. This makes SQUASH unsuitable for digital signatures but it is still an 
effective challenge-response MAC [1].  SQUASH does not require the tag to produce any 
random bits unlike the HB authentication scheme or its variants [8, 9, 10, 11], and has a formal 
proof of security based on Rabin’s public key cryptography algorithm [16].  Given a shared 
secret S between the reader and tag, and a random challenge R from the reader; the tag returns 
[m
2
 mod n]{i + l .. i} where n is of the form 2
k
 - 1, m is a k - 1 bit value generated by a non-linear 
feedback shift register (NLFSR) seeded with (R xor S), i is the chosen lsb of the hash output, and 
l is the chosen hash length which can be 32, 64, or 128 bits. 
Rand
om C
halle
nge (
R)
SQUASH(R, S)
 
Figure 1: SQUASH is simple challenge-response. 
 
 At the heart of SQUASH is the well studied Rabin cryptosystem, which provides the one 
way property used to hide the secret S.  This may seem unlikely at first since modular 
exponentiation is computationally expensive, and a poor choice for the resource constrained 
RFID.  In addition to being computationally expensive, the recommended bit length for the 
modulus n is at least 1024 bits; this number alone is beyond the storage capacity of most RFID 
tags.   To tailor SQUASH to RFID, several key adjustments are made which allow SQUASH to 
keep the formal proof of security of Rabin’s cryptosystem while conforming to the constraints of 
RFID.  
 First, do not store the modulus n; instead, use a Mersenne number like 2
1227
 – 1.  [1] 
proposes several suitable moduli.  Using a Mersenne number eliminates the need to store n and 
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simplifies the modular operation because 2
k
 = 1 mod n when n = 2
k
 -1 e.g. when n = 2
k
 -1, m
2
 = 
m1 * 2
k
 + m2 then m
2
 = m1 + m2 mod n.  Second, use a subset of c = m
2
 mod n as hash output 
from the center of c.  This can be closely approximated by computing eight to sixteen guard bits 
[1].  The exact carry in would require the entire result of m
2
 but [1] argues that approximating 
the carry with eight to sixteen guard bits is sufficient to be indistinguishable from the exact 
result.  Finally generate m on the fly using a NLFSR.  Summarizing the key points: 
 
 Do not store modulus n, instead use a Mersenne number like 21277 - 1 
 Output a subset of m2 mod n as hash of m  
 Generate m on the fly using a reversible non-linear feedback register 
 
SQUASH can be computed using successive convolutions.  To compute thirty-two bit 
length SQUASH with n = 2
1277
 - 1 [1] proposes the following algorithm: 
 Algorithm 1: SQUASH using successive convolutions [1]. 
a. Set j = 600 and set carry = 0 
b. Compute carry = carry + mv * mj-v mod k for v = 0,1,...,1276 
c. Set cj = lsb(carry), carry = rightshift(carry) 
d. Repeat steps b and c 48 times, and output the 32 bits c[647 .. 616] 
 
2.3 Sequence Generators 
 SQUASH uses a sequence generator to expand a seed into a larger sequence that is then 
used as m in c = m
2
 mod n. One of the most simple sequence generators is a linear feedback shift 
register (LFSR) show in figure 2. A LFSR can be constructed using a maximal polynomial which 
will iterate through all 2
n
 - 1 states (where n is the width of the LFSR) excluding the zero state. 
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The design of a LFSR is minimal and only consists of exclusive-or gates at the taps (which are 
the positions where the feedback polynomial coefficients are non zero.) While a LFSR meets the 
desired criteria of minimal hardware, it is not a good candidate for SQUASH because the 
sequence produced is linear.  The authors in [17] show that SQUASH can be broken when a 
linear sequence generator is used; therefore, SQUASH uses a non-linear sequence generator. 
 
Figure 2: A linear (left) and non-linear (right) feedback shift register. 
The suggested NLFSR for SQUASH is the non-linear portion of the Grain steam cipher 
[18].  The feedback function is a sum modulo two of a linear and a quadratic bent function with 
the following feedback polynomial g(x): 
g(x) = 1 + x
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2.4 SQUASH Architecture Using Successive Convolutions 
  A hardware SQUASH implementation using Algorithm (1) must address the modular 
operation on the position of the NLFSR.  While a single copy of the NLFSR is sufficient to 
produce the sequence m: at least two NLFSR copies are required because the multiplier and 
multiplicand are – on average – k/2 shifts apart and m is not stored in memory.  Using two copies 
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of NLFSR state addresses the spatial difference between the multiplier and multiplicand, but 
does not solve the modular position issue.  Figure 3 illustrates NLFSR position through several 
convolutions.  NLFSR1 generates the multiplicand value which cycles from [0 .. k - 1] inclusive.  
NLFSR2 generates the multiplier which wraps around from the zero position to the    k - 1 
position.  This wrap around, or modular operation on the NLFSR position, results in cycles 
dedicated to aligning the NLFSR to the proper position which we call alignment shifts. 
 
Figure 3: NLFSR position needed to generate m. 
 If only two copies of NLFSR state are maintained, alignment shifts will double latency, 
because every convolution requiring k cycles will also require k alignment shifts.  The authors in 
[1, 15] address this issue by using an auxiliary register to store states that correspond to breaks in 
the otherwise continuous lines in figure 3.  This approach adds significant area overhead by 
adding an eighty bit register, as well as multiplexors and exclusive-or gates to switch values 
between the auxiliary register and NLFSRs; however this scheme reduces alignment shifts to k.  
The k alignment shifts are incurred at the initialization step.  After the initialization step, the 
auxiliary register holds the state needed by the each NLFSR to eliminate additional shifts.  
Figure 4 shows the proposed design in [1, 15]. 
11 
  
2.5 Optimizing SQUASH for Squaring 
 Using successive convolutions to compute SQUASH is essentially column wise or 
Comba method multiplication [19] with a column width of a single bit.  This reduces carry 
propagation to a minimum and allows a twelve bit accumulator to suffice.  Since squaring is the 
underlying operation, it would be beneficial to optimize for squaring.  For each bit computed by 
Algorithm (1), k partial products are generated; however, only half are unique.  The multiplier a 
and multiplicand b are identical; therefore ai * bj = aj * bi.  Reducing partial product generation 
can be achieved by computing all unique partial products and shifting repeated partial products 
by one. 
 Optimizing for squaring has the potential to reduce the number of addition operations by 
a factor of two; however, it cannot be directly used with the architecture in [1, 15].  After the 
initialization step requiring k alignment shifts, the NLFSRs combined with the auxiliary register 
80 bit NLFSR 1
80  bit NLFSR 2
8
0
  b
it X
O
R
12  bit 
accumulator 80 bit auxiliary register
Figure 4: SQUASH architecture proposed in [1]. 
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generate the bits needed to compute each partial product in order.  These shifts also align the 
three state registers for the next convolution; therefore, grouping like terms using this 
architecture would reduce the number of additions per bit but proportionately increase the 
number of shifts needed to align the NLFSRs. 
 To optimize SQUASH for squaring recall that m
2
 = m1 * 2
k
 + m2, then m
2
 = m1 + m2 mod 
n when n = 2
k
 -1.  When computing SQUASH using successive convolutions, each bit of m1 + m2 
is computed together.  This does not allow any optimization for squaring because shifting the 
NLFSRs to the proper positions when moving between m1 and m2 negates the benefit of the 
optimization.  The NLFSRs only need to be aligned when computation switches between m1 and 
m2; as a result, optimizing for squaring provides the most benefit if m1 or m2 is computed entirely 
before computing the other and no benefit if computation alternates between m1 and m2 for each 
bit of m
2
. 
 A more complex adder is required to take advantage of the underlying squaring 
operation.  The adder width can be less than the width of m; the tradeoff is more alignment shifts.  
We recommend an adder width of thirty-two, which gives up to a twenty bit window before 
overflow becomes a concern and the adder must be shifted (for single bit precision).  For the 
most significant bits, overflow is not a concern and the adder length should shrink as 
computation approaches this point.  The adder must be able to operate on any bit position and 
properly handle overflow.  Figures 5 and 6 show two adder designs which fit these criteria. 
13 
bi
ci-1
Decoderi
XOR
32 – bit Accumulator
32 6:1 Decoders
5
32
Shift positions 
(from FSM)
Partial product
ci
 
Figure 5: A modified adder using decoders to shift the partial product. 
 Figure 5 shows a suitable adder for single bit precision SQUASH.  An individual adder 
cell is shown, which is a half adder with an additional or gate before the carry in.  The decoders 
shift the partial product to the appropriate column: effectively varying the width of the adder 
from one to thirty-two bits.  The control signals for the decoder are efficiently generated because 
the FSM already contains a counter that corresponds to the current column in the squaring 
operation.  The adder is enabled by combining the enable signal with the partial product with an 
and gate.  This is possible since an addition of zero does not change the stored value.  The figure 
does not show the shift connections between adder registers. 
32
enable signals (from FSM)
2x2 MUL
FA HAFA FAHAHA
32 shift reg with feedback
 
Figure 6: Adder width can be varied with individual register enable signals. 
 Full adders can be minimized for SQUASH with multiple bit precision as shown in figure 
6.  The partial products are aligned by shifting the register bits and the adder width can be 
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adjusted with enable signals.  This approach can be used for arbitrary precision.  The architecture 
for squaring optimized SQUASH is shown in figure 7 and consists of two NLFSRs and the 
adder.  For single precision: either adder can be used. Multiple bit precision requires the adder 
from figure 6.  The adder complexity and FSM complexity is increased but the auxiliary register 
and circuitry to switch state between the auxiliary register and NLFSRs is eliminated. 
80 bit NLFSR 2
80 bit NLFSR 1
32
enable signals (from FSM)
22
2x2 MUL
FA HAFA FAHAHA
32 bit shift reg with feedback
80 bit NLFSR 2
80 bit NLFSR 1
32 bit Accumulator
32 6:1 Decoders
5
current round (from FSM)
32
 
Figure 7: Dual bit (left) and single bit (right) SQUASH with the two proposed adders. 
 The squaring optimized SQUASH uses the same column method to compute SQUASH 
except partial products that are reoccurring are only computed once.  The adder allows 
reoccurring partial products to be shifted left.  The optimized SQUASH runs as follows.  First 
both NLFSRs are seeded and run for 256 cycles to obfuscate the seed value.  Next both NLFSRs 
run to the position corresponding to the non-reoccurring partial product in the first guard bit; this 
completes the initialization step.  From this point the FSM cycles through all the partial products 
in alternating order for m1, until a chosen point is reached: which is before risk of overflow 
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(recall m
2
 = m1 + m2 mod n).  The NLFSRs are adjusted for m2 and the same method is used to 
compute the partial result of m2, up until the risk of overflow point.  At this step the adder is 
shifted right, as in Algorithm (1), until the lsb of the adder corresponds to the current column.  
After the adder shift, computation of m2 resumes until the new risk of overflow point: at which 
the NLFSRs are aligned again, and computation of m1 resumes.  This cycle is repeated until the 
entire result is computed. 
 
2.6 Synthesis Results 
 Table 1 shows synthesis results for non-optimized SQUASH as well as squaring 
optimized SQUASH for single and dual bit precision.  All designs are thirty-two bit output with 
sixteen guard bits.  Synthesis and power simulation was done with Synopsys Design Vision.  A 
virtual standard cell library was used based on UMC 130 nm process which was obtained from 
Faraday [20].  For area comparisons, we also synthesized Grain-80 which is one of the smallest 
cryptographic primitives.  The Grain-80 description was VHDL and was obtained from 
OpenCores [21].  All our descriptions were written in Verilog.  The clock was set to 100 kHz. 
 As shown in table 1, optimized SQUASH has a clear advantage over the non-optimized 
design.  The twelve bit accumulator used in the non-optimized design is small but does not allow 
for squaring optimization.  In addition, the added circuitry to reduce alignment shifts adds 
significant area pushing the total area higher than the optimized design with the much larger 
adder.  The optimized design achieves nearly a 50 % reduction in latency; and the third entry, an 
optimized design with dual bit precision achieves an 86 % reduction in latency and is smaller 
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than the single bit non-optimized SQUASH.  The power numbers are also lower for the 
optimized designs.   
 Our comparison focuses on thirty-two bit output SQUASH with sixteen guard bits which 
uses an eighty bit NLFSR to generate m; but optimized SQUASH is preferable for all 
configurations.  In the non-optimized design, increasing NLFSR width results in an increase in 
area dedicated to the auxiliary register and the supporting circuitry.  This register and circuitry is 
eliminated in the optimized design and the adder complexity remains unchanged.  The optimized 
design eliminates approximately half of the partial products; however alignment shifts increase 
when output length increases.  The increase in latency due to extra alignment shifts is much less 
than the decrease due to elimination of repeating partial products; as a result, the optimized 
design will outperform the non-optimized design in terms of latency, in addition to having lower 
area and power consumption. 
Table 1: Synthesis results. 
Design Area (GE) Cycles Dynamic Power Leakage Power 
Non-Optimized 
SQUASH 
3169 62.8k 34.8 nW 13.5 nW 
Optimized SQUASH 2646 31.8k 24.7 nW 11.0 nW 
Dual-bit Optimized 
SQUASH 
2825 8.6k 23.6 nW 11.8 nW 
Grain-80 1391 N/A 22.2 nW 5.6 nW 
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CHAPTER 3 
SQUEEZING SQUASH 
3.1 Introduction 
 Squaring optimized SQUASH achieves a reduction in area but the duplicate NLFSR is 
still costly. Reducing SQUASH to one NLFSR would be ideal since the second NLFSR adds no 
additional state bits, only area overhead. Of course the reason two copies of state are used in 
squaring optimized SQUASH, and three in the original design, is due to NLFSR alignment shifts 
dominating latency without the added copies.  In order to reduce SQUASH down to a single 
NLFSR, the NLFSR would need to produce both multiplicand and multiplier in the same cycle 
for each partial product. 
 In [1], a concrete SQUASH proposal is discussed to address this issue; however, the 
proposal glosses over some key points which add significant area overhead.  We discuss this 
proposal and introduce our own SQUASH variant which we call permuted SQUASH 
(PSQUASH).  Our proposed variant achieves the smallest area while greatly reducing alignment 
shifts. 
 
 3.2 SQUASH with a Single NLFSR 
 If only one NLFSR is used in the example designs from the last chapter, a significant 
amount of time would be dedicated to sliding the NLFSR back and forth to obtain the correct 
bits. In such a scheme, the designer would want to add additional registers in order to look at a 
larger window of bits during each shift.  And, if the area·delay product is examined: it becomes 
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clear that the most efficient architecture is another independent window (i.e. another NLFSR). 
The additional NLFSR does not enhance security because it uses the same state.  Its purpose is 
simply to reduce alignment shifts.  Figure 8 illustrates this issue. 
 
Figure 8: The NLFSR only contains a window of the entire sequence. 
  Removing the additional NLFSR without increasing latency due to alignment shifts 
significantly reduces the area and power consumption of SQUASH.  Avoiding the penalty of 
alignment shifts with a single NLFSR requires that the NLFSR always contains the current 
multiplicand and multiplier bits within the current state; as well as the next multiplicand and 
multiplier bits contained in the next state, for all states. 
 
3.3 A Single NLFSR SQUASH Proposal 
 A single NLFSR SQUASH design is proposed in [1] and shown in figure 9.  Adi Shamir 
proposed this design for k = 128 which makes n = 2 
128
 - 1.  The NLFSR is seeded and run for 
512 cycles to obfuscate the seed; at which point the NLFSR stops, containing all bits of m since 
m is now 128 bits long.  The FSM then computes SQUASH, in the same manner as Algorithm 
(1), but adjusted to k = 128 and eight guard bits.  Adi Shamir claims this design is smaller than 
Grain-128.  The NLFSR is the non-linear portion of Grain-128 which like the Grain-80 NLFSR 
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is a sum modulo two of a linear function and a quadratic bent function with the following 
feedback polynomial g(x): 
g(x) = 1 + x
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128 bit NLFSR
8 bit accumulator
 
Figure 9: A single NLFSR design proposed in [1]. 
There are several issues with this proposed design; the first of which is the limited choice 
for the modulus n.  This design stores m instead of generating it on the fly, which works well 
when for k = 128; but as k is increased, the cost of storing m quickly grows to thousands of gates.  
Using k = 128 also violates the assumption of a modulus with no known factors; therefore, the 
formal proof of security is not applicable.  If an attack is devised on SQUASH with a factorable 
modulus, this design will not scale for a larger modulus.  The second issue with this design is 
that it is not as small as [1] claims.  The NLFSR is the biggest block in Grain and consumes half 
the total area.  Selecting each bit from the NLFSR when computing SQUASH, without 
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additional alignment shifts, requires two 128:1 multiplexors (as shown in figure 9).  These 
structures and the corresponding control circuitry add significant area overhead.  When 
combined with the counters and FSM complexity of SQUASH, this design is likely to be roughly 
the size of Grain-128. 
 
3.4 Permuted SQUASH 
 Reducing squaring optimized SQUASH down to a single NLFSR can be achieved with a 
static permutation on the NLFSR sequence output: resulting in any pair of multiplicand and 
multiplier existing within the NLFSR state. As described above, SQUASH uses a NLFSR to 
generate sequence m and computes m
2
 mod n; likewise, permuted SQUASH generates m` using 
the same NLFSR structure but then permutes m` into m using a static permutation and computes 
m
2
 mod n. 
 
Figure 10: PSQUASH adds a permutation to the flow. 
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The added permutation does not undermine the security proof of SQUASH put forth in 
[1]. SQUASH is based on the strength of Rabin’s PKC and this change does not reduce n. It is 
important to note that while Rabin’s PCK is not affected by the choice of encrypted message (in 
our case NLFSR output m); care must be taken when designing the sequence generator for 
SQUASH. The authors in [17] show that SQUASH can be broken when a linear sequence 
generator is used to generate m. In this case, we use the same non-linear generator and perform a 
linear permutation on the final output which does not destroy non-linearity. This method of 
generating m (or in this case m`) does not make permuted SQUASH susceptible to the attack 
described in [17]. 
 An efficient permutation for PSQUASH has two requirements; it must eliminate 
alignment shifts, and it should consume less area and power than a duplicate NLFSR.  Several 
possible permutations were evaluated. The final choice eliminates alignment shifts after the 
initialization step, and uses a fraction of the gates required by a duplicate NLFSR.  This 
permutation can be constructed for any value of k.  The permutation is based on the msb of 
SQUASH output and is simply the column squaring ordering for the msb.  Figure 11 shows the 
permutation, which starts with the middle of the m2 column and ends with the middle of m1 
column.  The resulting mapping has the multiplier and multiplicand bits in an order that is based 
on the current round and is fairly efficiently multiplexed. Only one large multiplexor is needed 
and the control signals can be generated using circuitry with a fraction of the area cost of a 
duplicate NLFSR. 
NLFSR 0 1 2 3 … 646 647 648 649 650 651 … 1274 1275 1276 
P(NLFSR) 324 323 325 322 … 647 0 648 1276 649 1275 … 961 963 962 
Figure 11: An example permutation for k = 1277, 32 output bits, and 16 guard bits. 
22 
 Figure 11 is color coded to show how the msb of SQUASH output is used to build the 
permutation.  This permutation is for the SQUASH parameters in Algorithm (1).  The green 
portion corresponds to the partial products of m2 or as in Algorithm (1) the partial products 
computed by mv * mj-v mod k for v = 0, 1, ..., 647.  The blue portion corresponds to the partial 
products of m1 or as in Algorithm (1) the partial products computed by mv * mj-v mod k for v = 648, 
649, ..., 1276.  This approach can be used to map any set of SQUASH parameters but it is only 
efficient when the NLFSR width does not exceed 2 * (guard + output bits). 
 The maximum distance for any two operands is 2 * (guard + output bits); therefore, the 
NLFSR length must not be less than the maximum distance to eliminate alignment shifts.  With 
our example parameters (32 output bits, 16 guard bits), 96 bits of NLFSR must be available in 
order to avoid alignment shifts. For the smallest SQUASH output (thirty-two) with only eight 
guard bits, an eighty bit NLFSR can be used.  This restriction means that some combinations of 
NLFSR length and SQUASH output are not suitable for PSQUASH; however, PSQUASH is far 
more flexible than the single NLFSR proposal in [1] and places no restrictions on the size of the 
modulus.  PSQUASH also requires smaller multiplexors than the single NLFSR proposal in [1].  
Only one 80:1 and one 2:1 multiplexor is needed in PSQUASH for thirty-two bit output and 
eight guard bit configuration; the proposal in [1] requires two 128:1 multiplexors. 
 PSQUASH is run by seeding the NLFSR and running for 128 cycles.  This number is cut 
in half from its SQUASH counterpart, because the NLFSR shifts two bits at a time.  An 
additional twenty-four cycles are needed to move to the starting position for the lsb, since the 
starting position corresponds to the starting position for the msb bit.  The number of shifts in this 
step is double the sum of output and guard bits.  After these initialization steps, the NLFSR is 
shifted once per partial product.  Each unique partial product is generated without repetition for 
23 
each output bit: with the non-reoccurring term from the next column generated in the current 
column.  This ordered generation of partial products without alignment shifts requires a simple 
accumulator and is optimized for squaring.  This behavior is achieved by selecting the 
multiplicand and multiplier using multiplexors.  The control signals are generated by an 
arithmetic relation with the counters values already required by SQUASH.  Figure 12 shows the 
design for thirty-two output bits and sixteen guard bits.  The NLFSR width and multiplexor 
width can be reduced to eighty bits if only eight guard bits are used. 
128 bit NLFSR
11 bit accumulator
NLFSR[95:0]
NLFSR[0]
NLFSR[1]
 
Figure 12: A PSQUASH design. 
 
3.5 Synthesis Results 
 We synthesized PSQUASH using two NLFSR sizes, with the design flow described in 
the last chapter.  The smallest PSQUASH configuration of thirty-two output bits and eight guard 
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bits can use an eighty bit NLFSR and was synthesized with 1624 GE.  A 128 bit NLFSR was 
used for thirty-two bit output with sixteen guard bits.  Both designs are synthesized under 2k GE, 
which is a sizable improvement over the non-permuted SQUASH.  PSQUASH also consumes 
less power than the optimized SQUASH designs and reduces latency by eliminating more 
alignment shifts.  PSQUASH outperforms SQUASH in all categories.  The only disadvantage of 
PSQUASH is the restrictions on minimum NLFSR size; however, unlike the SQUASH designs 
which need multiple copies of state, PSQUASH adds state bits.  A wider NLFSR increases the 
security by increasing pre-image resistance.  Even if the added state is unnecessary: PSQUASH 
outperforms SQUASH. 
Table 2: Synthesis results with PSQUASH added. 
Design Area (GE) Cycles Dynamic Power Leakage Power 
Non-Optimized 
SQUASH 
3169 62.8k 34.8 nW 13.5 nW 
Optimized SQUASH 2646 31.8k 24.7 nW 11.0 nW 
Dual-bit Optimized 
SQUASH 
2825 8.6k 23.6 nW 11.8 nW 
128 NLFSR 
PSQUASH 
1918 30.2k 17.3 nW 8.9 nW 
80 NLFSR 
PSQUASH 
1624 25.1k 18.3 nW 7.7 nW 
Grain-80 1391 N/A 22.2 nW 5.6 nW 
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CHAPTER 4 
SQUASH ON COMPUTATIONAL RFID 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Computation RFID (CRFID) refers to contactless smartcards which operate like 
traditional finite state (FSM) machine driven RFID tags, but use an embedded microprocessor 
[22].  Electronic product tags and access cards are examples of traditional tags; these tags 
perform a set of tasks and are typically on custom silicon.  The high non-recurring engineering 
cost (NRE) of these devices is absorbed by the incredibly large volumes.  CRFID NRE costs can 
be significantly lower because development is in software.  In addition to lower NRE costs, 
CRFID promise to provide the flexibility of general purpose processing to RFID. 
Using a microprocessor on a resource constrained device is not a new idea.  In fact, 
smartcards have used microprocessors like the Intel 8051 for years.  While contact smartcards 
have used embedded microprocessors for years, contactless smartcards have been predominantly 
FSM driven.  We believe that embedded microprocessors will become more prevalent in RFID.  
SQUASH benefits from these next generation CRFID tags because ALUs and memory address 
many of the issues that emerge in a hardware SQUASH implementation. 
 
4.2 The WISP 
 The Wirelessly Powered Platform for Sensing and Computation (WISP) [23] is a 
prototype platform for CRFID (shown in figure 13).  The WISP discussed here is the first 
generation model and is a MSP430F1232 microcontroller on a PCB board which adds circuitry 
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that allows the device to harvest power and communicate like a typical UHF tag.  The 
MSPF1232 is a sixteen bit microcontroller with 256 bytes of RAM and FLASH memory and 8k 
bytes of ROM.  There is no hardware multiplier, which would be desirable for SQUASH, but it 
is still able to run SQUASH on harvested power. 
 
Figure 13: First Generation WISP. 
 Power harvested from the UHF reader is insufficient to run the microcontroller on the 
WISP.  To address this issue, the WISP performs computation in a duty cycle.  The 
microcontroller cycles between low power sleep mode and active mode, allowing charge to 
gather on the capacitor when in sleep mode.  Figure 14 shows the voltage on the capacitor as the 
WISP charges up and performs computation.  The blue trace shows the voltage on the capacitor, 
which drops when the microcontroller switches to the active cycle (yellow trace).  The stored 
charge is regulated to a target voltage of 3.3 V.  The microcontroller operates as long as the 
voltage on the capacitor does not drop below 3.3V during active cycle. 
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4.3 SQUASH on the WISP 
 IAR Embedded Workbench [24] was used for development and the source code was 
written in C.  The source code for communicating with the Alien UHF reader [25] and cycle the 
microcontroller through the duty cycle was provided by Intel Research Seattle [26] with the 
WISP.  The microcontroller was programmed with a USB-FET430UIF [27].  The RFID reader 
was controlled using the One Wisp GUI which was developed by Intel Research Seattle. 
 We evaluated the potential for SQUASH on CRFID by programming the WISP to 
compute a thirty-two bit SQUASH output with sixteen guard bits and send the thirty-two bit 
output to the UHF reader.  To reduce alignment shifts, two copies of the eighty bit NLFSR 
suggested in [1] are stored in memory.  As mentioned previously, since SQUASH uses a 
Mersenne number for the modulus, the resulting hash is some chosen subset of b
2
[k-1 .. 0] (bottom 
half) + b
2
[2k-1 .. k] (top half): where b is the k bit sequence generated by the NLFSR.  Each time 
computation switches between the bottom and top half: the NLFSR position must be adjusted.  
We compute the full bottom half before computing the top half to minimize alignment shifts.   
Figure 14: WISP power cycle.  Charge is gathered during sleep mode and discharged during 
computation and communication. 
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Column squaring was used to perform the squaring operation similar to the approach used in 
hardware implementation.  The general rule for choosing between column and row squaring is 
the cost of memory access versus cost of carry propagation.  We chose the column method 
because we could not efficiently propagate carries in C, but from our results we will show that 
row method squaring is the better choice for SQUASH, especially if carries can be handled 
efficiently.  
 
Figure 15: WISP Power trace when computing and transmitting SQUASH packet.  Blue trace is 
voltage and yellow trace denotes computation.  WISP distance from reader, from top left to bottom 
right:  6", 12", 24",  30". 
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Multiplication and NLFSR shifts were performed in eight bit precision.  The WISP does 
not have a hardware multiplier, and multiplications are computed using Horner’s method [28].  
Computing thirty-two bit output SQUASH with sixteen guard bits requires 468 multiplications, 
and each multiplication requires both NLFSRs to shift for a total of 936 shifts.  In addition to the 
NLFSR shifts during multiplication, 70 shifts are needed to initialize the NLFSRs and 78 shifts 
are needed to align the NLFSRs when computation switches from the bottom to the top half.  A 
total of 468 multiplications and 1084 NLFSR shifts are needed to complete the algorithm. 
 
Figure 16: WISP power traces for static ID.  Blue trace is capacitor voltage and yellow trace is 
computation of packet (static ID is nearly instant).  Distance from reader from top left to bottom 
right: 2', 3', 4', 5' 
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 The WISP clock speed was set to 3 Mhz and SQUASH takes approximately 240 ms to 
complete.  The WISP was programmed to run the full algorithm before switching to low power 
mode which reduces the WISPs effective range.  Figure 15 shows several WISP power traces 
while running SQUASH with successful transmissions up to two feet from the reader; however, 
power harvested is inadequate to operate when the distance from the reader exceeds thirty 
inches.  Figure 16 shows power traces of a WISP programmed to transmit a static ID, which 
requires minimal computation.  The read range of a static ID is between four and five feet and is 
the maximum effective read range of the device.  
Table 3: SQUASH and RC5 specs on 3V WISP. 
 MEM (bytes) CODE (bytes) Latency (ms) 
SQUASH 29 1848 240 
RC5 112 1518 9.4 
 
 The first generation WISP is a poor target for SQUASH primarily because it lacks a 
hardware multiplier.  Table 3 shows the code size and latency of SQUASH and a RC5 
implementation on the same device [29].  While RC5 is not a MAC but a block cipher, a MAC 
can be constructed using a block cipher [30]; therefore SQUASH is not well suited for the first 
generation WISP because a hardware multiplier is essential for fast SQUASH.  The latency of 
SQUASH on the WISP can be decreased by using the method described in the next section; 
however, without a hardware multiplier, SQUASH will still perform poorly. 
 
4.4 Efficient Software SQUASH 
From a software standpoint, SQUASH is similar to a multi-precision arithmetic problem.  
While it is possible to use successive convolutions to compute SQUASH on a microprocessor, 
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advanced squaring techniques offer a significant advantage.  For example, using successive 
convolutions requires twice as many multiplications as column or row based squaring.  There are 
a few factors to consider when choosing a multi-precision algorithm for an embedded 
microprocessor.  These include the cost of memory access versus the cost of a multiply 
operation, the number of available registers, and the availability of an add with carry instruction. 
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    A2 B0          A1 B0  
   A3 B0           A0 B1  
                  
              A2 B0   
     A0 B1        A1 B1   
    A1 B1         A0 B2   
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 A3 B3          A2 B2     
            A1 B3     
                  
   A0 B3       A3 B2      
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 A2 B3                
A3 B3         A3 B3       
Figure 17: Row wise (left) and column wise (right) ordering. 
The authors in [31] point out that while advanced multiplication techniques, like 
Karatsuba Ofman [32], reduce multiplications over column or row methods; they are not well 
suited for embedded applications due to their recursive nature.  The reason being: recursive 
function calls can quickly exhaust the memory allocated for the stack.  Column and row methods 
are not recursive and better suited for the limited memory of embedded devices.  Each method 
has its own advantage and can be optimized for squaring.  Row based multiplication reduces 
memory accesses because the multiplicand is reused, but this comes at a cost of increased 
additions due to carry propagation.  This method also requires more available registers to be 
effective [31].  Column based multiplication requires minimal register space because the product 
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is computed in columns starting with the least significant position; however the cost is increased 
memory accesses. 
 In SQUASH, the input to the squaring algorithm is not available in memory but must be 
generated with an NLFSR.  This leads to key considerations when choosing a squaring method: 
 NLFSR access is costly 
 NLFSR is not random access 
The first observation states that in SQUASH, the multiplier and multiplicand need to be 
generated by the NLFSR which is computationally expensive.  This means that a row based 
method is always preferable since it reduces NLFSR shifts.  The second observation is that the 
NLFSR produces an ordered output; that is, values are produced from left to right or right to left 
and all values between the current state and target state must be produced in order to move to the 
target state.  This means ordering can have a significant impact on performance. 
 In an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) on embedded microprocessors implementation, 
[31] proposes a hybrid method when there is insufficient register space which breaks the 
computation into columns but performs row wise multiplication within the columns.  This is 
essentially what SQUASH forces, because the output is some subset of the full result and it can 
be computed with the hybrid method described in [31].  However, unlike other arithmetic 
operations in which the operands are expected to be in memory, SQUASH’s operands must be 
generated on the fly.  This means that the column width should be the full SQUASH length even 
if there are insufficient registers: because a memory load and store is preferable to NLFSR shifts.  
In addition to the reduction in NLFSR shifts from a static multiplier in each row, a further 
reduction in NLFSR shifts can be achieved because the NLFSR stores a subset of the 
multiplicand. 
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 To see how the ordering of partial products has a big impact on NLFSR shifts, refer to 
figure 18.  In the column method, each column requires k/2 partial products; but each partial 
product requires a NLFSR shift for the multiplier and multiplicand; for a total of k NLFSR shifts 
per column (recall k is the bit length of the modulus).  The row method is expected to reduce 
NLFSR shifts with each row requiring a single shift for the multiplier and l shifts for the 
multiplicand (recall l is the combined length of output and guard bits).  Notice that any 
subsequent rows are only separated by one shift and the total length l is typically shorter than the 
NLFSR width.  As a result, the entire multiplicand can be contained within the NLFSR state, and 
only one shift is needed to move to the next row.  This reduces the NLFSR shifts needed for row 
method to two shifts per row when NLFSR width is greater than l.  If k = 1277, l = 48, and 
NLFSRs shift one bit per cycle and alignment shifts are not considered, the column method 
requires k * l = 61.3k shifts; on the other hand, the row method requires only 2 * k/2 = 1278 
shifts. 
Column 3 Column 2 Column 1  Row 3 Row 2 Row 1 
  
i = 0 .. 300 
j = 600 ..300 
   
i = 0 
j = 647 .. 600 
 
i = 0 .. 300 
j = 601 ..300 
   
i = 1 
j = 646 .. 599 
 
i = 0 .. 301 
j = 602 ..301 
   
i = 2 
j = 645 .. 598 
  
Figure 18: First three columns and rows of a partial SQUASH computation. 
 
 The extra reduction in NLFSR shifts outlined above is possible when NLFSR width is 
greater than l.  If this is not the case, there are two options for the software SQUASH designer.  
If there is available memory, a third copy on NLFSR state can be stored which doubles the 
length of multiplicand available in memory without NLFSR shifts.  The second option is to 
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reduce the column width to the length of the NLFSR.  In this case, reducing the width of the 
column can be more efficient than the full output length column size.  The rows should be 
computed from right to left to reduce alignment shifts for the NLFSRs. 
 
4.5 Best Case SQUASH Performance on CRFID 
 For our test case, the WISP device was chosen for its unique characteristic of operating 
on passive power but it was not an ideal target because it lacked a hardware multiplier.  In 
addition, we used column squaring instead of the optimal method outlined above which resulted 
in high latency.  For the ideal case, a hardware multiplier is a must; also, an add with carry 
instruction and assembly coding is needed for efficient carry propagation.  If these conditions are 
met, assuming an eight bit microprocessor with SQUASH parameters k = 1277 and thirty-two bit 
output with sixteen guard bits; 468 multiplications, 156 NLFSR shifts during squaring, and 112 
NLFSR shifts for initialization and alignment are needed to complete the algorithm.  It is clear 
that NLFSR shifts will dominate latency since a single shift takes approximately 230 cycles.  
Even if a very optimistic five cycles are needed to compute and add the result of each 
multiplication, the total clock cycles for additions, multiplications, and NLFSR shifts is 
approximately 61k cycles. 
 In conclusion, software SQUASH is a good fit for CRFID but requires a hardware 
multiplier.  In [1], the author claims that SQUASH will benefit from ALUs which may be found 
on future RFID tags.  We show that despite the larger precision of embedded ALU’s, the 
inefficiency of the NLFSR in software prohibits SQUASH from distinguishing itself from 
software block ciphers, which could be used in the same way.  The algorithm proposed in [1] 
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performs poorly, requiring 2 * k * l NLFSR shifts; but this number can be reduced to k using the 
hybrid row method technique described above. 
 Software SQUASH may be better suited for RFID than the hardware counterpart.  A 
more efficient software NLFSR would greatly reduce the latency of software SQUASH, making 
SQUASH attractive for CRFID.  Latency is critical because we expect many CRFID applications 
to be battery powered.  In that situation, longer execution time generally means more energy 
consumption.  SQUASH has a fairly small memory footprint, and if a different NLFSR was 
used, SQUASH would be a good choice for CRFID. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Practical Applications for PSQUASH 
  While PSQUASH is larger than most lightweight authentication methods and has 
considerably larger latency, it has several strengths over these other methods.  The formal proof 
of security, a non-probabilistic method, and no random number generation requirement are the 
key advantages of PSQUASH.  Our synthesized design for 128 bit NLFSR PSQUASH is just 
below the 2k GE mark, which is within the area budget for RFID tags.  Authentication schemes 
that rely on a backend server to minimize tag resources may require significantly lower area, but 
the larger area of PSQUASH may be justified in applications where a backend server assisted 
approach is not practical.  Another consideration is that no additional area needs to be dedicated 
to a TRNG, which may otherwise be unnecessary for a tag. 
 The area of PSQUASH is within reasonable constraints but a greater limiting factor is the 
high latency.  Specifically, the supply chain application may not be a good choice for PSQUASH 
due to the high latency.  Practical applications for SQUASH are those in which latency is not a 
critical factor.  Examples of such applications may be access cards, some micro payment 
systems, and anti-counterfeiting tags.  In the case of a supply chain application or inventory 
control, a retail shelf or conveyor belt may carry hundreds of tags; and even if these tags can be 
authorized concurrently, an automated system may be inefficient when individual responses from 
tags require a relatively large delay.  The same delay may be considered relatively low in an 
access card application where the delay is perceived by a human operator passing an access 
37 
point.  The latency can be significantly reduced by using multi-bit precision, but this increases 
area consumption. 
 Tags for replacement parts are a good fit for PSQUASH.  In the cell phone replacement 
battery application described earlier, the cell phone is a networked device capable of accessing a 
backend server, but using the limited bandwidth may be undesirable.  A stronger case can be 
made for devices that are unlikely to have network access.  Many products have a business 
model that relies heavily on replacement parts. These products could benefit from a PSQUASH 
tag.  Some examples are automotive replacements parts, replacement parts for consumer 
electronics like cameras, and copier and printer toner cartridges.  In these applications, a 
PSQUASH tag can increase revenue because parts can be authenticated.   
 
5.2 Comparing SQUASH and PSQUASH to Hashes Constructed from Symmetric Ciphers 
Adi Shamir points out that hash functions like SHA family owe a large amount of their 
complexity to collision resistance; therefore, SQUASH is better suited because collision 
resistance is not necessary for a challenge response MAC [1].  In other words, SQUASH is 
effective because it is one way; however this is also true of MACs constructed with symmetric 
ciphers.  In [33] the authors make a case for using AES to construct hash functions for RFID due 
to lower area and power consumption over other hash functions including SHA-1, SHA-256, 
MD4, and MD5.  CMAC can be constructed with symmetric ciphers [30]; furthermore, since the 
challenge response MACs do not require collision resistance, any symmetric cipher can be used.  
A SHA-256 ASIC design is synthesized in [33] with 10,868 GE and [4] presents an AES 
design using 3,595 GE with a latency of 1016 cycles.  All the SQUASH designs discussed in this 
thesis consume much less area than SHA-256.  PSQUASH consumes significantly less area than 
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the AES design, but has a latency that is an order of magnitude higher.  While PSQUASH may 
be the better choice over AES when area is a primary concern and the additional latency can be 
tolerated, the advantage in area disappears when compared to lightweight ciphers like Grain or 
PRESENT.  Both ciphers are comparable in size to the smallest implementation of PSQUASH 
with an eighty bit NLFSR, but have much lower latency.  Full round PRESENT is two orders of 
magnitude faster than PSQUASH; also serialized PRESENT is an order of magnitude faster than 
SQUASH and requires only 1k GE [34]. 
The same is true for software implementations; however software SQUASH gives up less 
latency to software symmetric ciphers.  Our work shows how NLFSR shifts can be greatly 
reduced over the original method of successive convolutions, but the inefficiency of NLFSR 
shifts in software still dominate latency.  SQUASH can be a good choice over some steam 
ciphers from the eSTREAM project [35], but is still outperformed by a software implementation 
of PRESENT [36] and RC5 [29].  In addition, SQUASH requires a hardware multiplier, which is 
not typically required by symmetric ciphers.  SQUASH may be improved if a faster software 
NLFSR is used in place of the proposed NLFSR.  Even a marginal reduction in NLFSR 
complexity would greatly benefit software SQUASH, since the latency is heavily dominated by 
NLFSR shifts. 
 
5.3 Our Contribution 
In this thesis, we synthesized the generic SQUASH design proposed in [1] as an ASIC 
implementation.  We showed that in addition to the large latency of SQUASH, area consumption 
is a concern.  The SQUASH design proposed in [1] has a large area overhead due to the multiple 
copies of state, which are stored to reduce latency.  We show that SQUASH can be optimized for 
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squaring if the adder complexity is increased.  This optimization reduces latency by eliminating 
repetition of reoccurring partial products.  We also showed that the third copy of NLFSR state 
can be removed with a reordering of partial products.  The removal of the third copy of state and 
the circuitry to switch values between the auxiliary register and NLFSRs, even with the addition 
of a more complex adder, reduces the area consumption of SQUASH. 
 The duplicate NLFSR in SQUASH contributes a significant area overhead.  In his 
SQUASH proposal, Adi Shamir proposes a single NLFSR design but the area consumption of 
this design is understated and it is not scalable to a larger modulus.  We propose a new variant 
called PSQUASH which adds a permutation to the NLFSR output.  This permutation allows 
PSQUASH to use a simple accumulator and single NLFSR to compute m
2
 mod n.  The proposed 
change does not destroy non-linearity of the NLFSR and allows us to use the formal proof of 
security of SQUASH.  The smallest PSQUASH configuration is synthesized with 1624 GE 
which is within the security budget of RFID tags.  Although we significantly reduce the area and 
latency of SQUASH with our PSQUASH variant, the area consumption is slightly more than 
some notable symmetric ciphers; moreover, the latency of PSQUASH is much higher. 
 Adi Shamir suggests SQUASH is well positioned to take advantage of next generation 
RFID tags which may have ALUs because SQUASH is scalable to arbitrary word width.  We 
tested SQUASH on a prototype CRFID.  Our results show that while SQUASH benefits from 
ALUs in embedded microprocessors, the cost of NLFSR shifts in software negate the benefit of 
increased word width.  A method to choose the optimal partial product ordering is introduced 
which greatly reduces NLFSR shifts.  This reordering of partial products makes SQUASH 
comparable to software implementation of symmetric ciphers; however a software friendly 
NLFSR is needed for faster SQUASH on CRFID. 
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 SQUASH is a novel idea but the large squaring operation leads to a large latency, and for 
this reason, it is unlikely to be deployed in many RFID applications.  New lightweight symmetric 
ciphers have significantly lower latency, while consuming slightly less area: making them a 
better choice for constructing a challenge response MAC.  These ciphers are relatively new, and 
have not been extensively studied as Rabin’s cryptosystem, but they have received significant 
peer review.  Still SQUASH has a potential to be used in RFID systems and its use has been 
proposed in [37, 38, 39].  For potential SQUASH applications, our contributions offer a 
significant reduction in area and/or latency. 
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